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Footnotes 
1. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 164 (C.
Gray ed. 1971)(1st ed. 1713) (“[b]y this Course of personal and
open examination, there is Opportunity for all Persons concerned,
viz. The Judge, or any of the Jury . . . to propound occasional ques-
tions, which beats and boults out the Truth”).
2. See Ohio v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St. 3d 127, 130-132; 789 N.E.2d 222,
226-228 (2003) for a review of federal and state cases.
3. See, e.g., M. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking
Rights”:  Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L. REV.
1229, 1253 (1993).
4. See, e.g., N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in
Trial, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 553 (2004).
5. Ohio v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St. 3d 127, 131; 789 N.E.2d 222, 226
(2003).
6. We use the word “permit” to refer to the practice of letting jurors
submit questions during trial; we use the word “allow” to refer to the
decision to answer a juror’s question or let a witness to answer it. 
7. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 564 (“When questions are not
asked after being formulated by a juror, he/she may become upset
with one of the parties, especially the one objecting to his/her ques-
tions [even though] the objections to the questions are made out-
side of the jury’s presence”).
8. The Arizona rule authorizing the practice of juror questioning in
civil cases specifies that “Jurors shall be permitted to submit to the
court written questions directed to witnesses or the court.
Opportunity shall be given to counsel to object to such questions
out of the presence of the jury.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, for
good cause the court may prohibit or limit the submission of ques-
tions to witnesses.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 39(b)(10).  Consistent with this
language, the standard practice in Arizona is to permit juror ques-
tions and jurors were so instructed in all 50 of the cases we studied. 
9. The Arizona Supreme Court authorized the taping of jury discus-
sions and deliberations in these 50 trials as part of an evaluation of
another jury innovation: permitting jurors to discuss the case in
the course of the trial.  The results of that evaluation are reported
in Shari S. Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth
Murphy, Jury Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 U. ARIZ. L. REV 1 (2003). 
American courts have rediscovered what was familiar atcommon law.1 A majority of modern courts now sanc-tion the practice of permitting jurors to submit ques-
tions during trial.2 A procedure that permits jurors to submit
questions is consistent with the view that juror questions can
promote juror understanding of the evidence3 and fits with
other jury innovations, like note taking and written jury
instructions, that aim at optimizing juror comprehension and
recall.  Nonetheless, the practice of permitting juror questions
has not received unanimous endorsement and adoption.4 Even
in jurisdictions that authorize juror questions during trial, the
ultimate decision as to whether or not to permit them is gen-
erally left to the discretion of the trial court,5 and it is unclear
how pervasive the practice actually is across jurisdictions in
which juror questions are authorized.  
Some judges have been reluctant to permit juror questions
because of concerns that jurors will frequently submit inad-
missible questions that the judge cannot answer or allow6 a
witness to address, that the jurors may be offended when their
questions are not answered,7 and that jurors may come up with
their own answers that will unfairly prejudice one party or the
other. A unique opportunity allowed us to examine the fre-
quency and nature of jurors’ unanswered questions and to
assess how jurors responded.  We collected all of the questions
that jurors submitted during 50 civil trials in Arizona, where
jurors are regularly permitted to submit questions during
trial.8 A distinctive feature of the research is that we were able
not only to identify the questions that the judge declined to
allow, but also to observe juror reactions during trial and delib-
erations as the jurors learned that their question would not be
allowed.9 This examination both addresses the concerns
raised about unanswered juror questions and gives judges who
have not yet permitted juror questions a preview of the kind of
questions jurors are likely to submit that judges may not be
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10. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question
Asking: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121
(1994) 
11. Id. at 142-143, Table 13.
12. Mary Dodge, Should Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Cases? at
40 (unpublished report submitted to the Colorado Supreme
Court’s Jury System Committee, 2002).
13. See, e.g., Warren D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation
of Witnesses, CBA REC. 12 (Feb. 1987).
14. Howard Ross Cabot & Christopher S. Coleman, Arizona Jury
Reform:  A View From the Trenches, ARIZ. J. (July 12, 1999).
15. See, e.g., Mark Frankel, Jurors Questioning Witnesses, 60 WISC. BAR
BULL. 23 (Feb. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Leonard B. Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven
Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second
Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 476, Appendix D (1985); for a
comprehensive review of findings in several studies, see Gregory
E. Mize & Christopher J. Connelly, Jury Trial Innovations:
Charting a Rising Tide, Spring 2004 COURT REVIEW at 4, 5-6.
17. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in
Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256
(1996).
18. See supra note 7.
19. See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 17.
20. For a detailed description of these procedures, see Diamond et al.,
supra note 9, at 17.
able to allow witnesses to answer. 
Before turning to this analysis of the unanswered questions,
we briefly review the claimed advantages and disadvantages of
permitting juror questions in light of the available evidence.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JUROR 
QUESTIONS
The primary claim made in favor of permitting juror ques-
tions is that it promotes juror understanding of the evidence.
To the extent that jurors are like students in their attempts to
understand the material being presented to them at trial,
answers to juror questions, like those given to students in a
classroom, offer the opportunity to correct sources of confu-
sion, clarify misunderstandings, and improve comprehension
and recall.  Some support for this proposition comes from a
national field experiment in which 160 cases in 33 states were
randomly assigned to permit or not permit juror questions.10
Jurors who were permitted to submit questions rated them-
selves as better informed than those who were not permitted to
submit questions.11 Similarly, in a Colorado field experiment
involving 239 criminal trials, jurors who were permitted to
submit questions were more likely to agree that they had suffi-
cient information to reach a correct decision.12
Another potential advantage of juror questions is that they
can signal counsel, as they do an instructor in a classroom, that
some issues need to be addressed further.  It is unclear how
often this occurs, but judges who have permitted juror ques-
tions13 and attorneys who have tried cases in which questions
were permitted14 report instances in which the juror questions
assisted attorneys in presenting their cases clearly.  Similarly,
judges report that jurors appear more attentive and involved
when questions are permitted.15
Judges who have experimented with juror questions have
generally become more enthusiastic about permitting juror
questions after trying out the procedure.16 Jurors too report
satisfaction with the opportunity to submit questions.17
Critics of juror questioning have suggested that permitting
juror questions might upset court decorum and consume
unnecessary court time.  Judges who permit juror questions
generally address those concerns by instructing jurors at the
beginning of the trial that they can write down a question and
submit it to the judge through the bailiff.  The judge then con-
sults with the attorneys out of the presence of the jury, usually
at a sidebar, and determines whether to ask the witness the
juror’s question.  If proper, the judge puts the question to the
witness.  Attorneys are per-
mitted to ask any necessary
follow-up questions.  This
procedure handles juror ques-
tions efficiently, minimizing
the additional time that juror
questions may require.
A separate set of concerns,
and our focus in this article, is
on juror reactions to the ques-
tions they submit that are not
answered.18 Do jurors react
unfavorably if their questions
are not answered, taking offense or experiencing unnecessary
embarrassment?  Are questions rejected because jurors become
argumentative, losing their objectivity and becoming advo-
cates?  Do jurors draw inappropriate inferences when the court
does not  allow a juror question?  Juror surveys find no evi-
dence to support these concerns,19 but these self-reports about
socially undesirable reactions may not fully capture what
occurs in the jury room.  The Arizona Filming Project made it
possible for us to examine the questions that jurors submitted
during trial that the judge was unable to allow and to assess
how jurors actually handled the lack of a response.  We begin
by briefly describing the Arizona Filming Project and then turn
to the unanswered juror questions. 
THE ARIZONA FILMING PROJECT
The Pima County Superior Court, with the endorsement
and support of the Arizona Supreme Court, approved a novel
experiment in Tucson to evaluate the Arizona innovation that
permits jurors to discuss the evidence among themselves dur-
ing the trial.  The study involved videotaping discussions and
deliberations. The project required an elaborate set of permis-
sions and security procedures.20 In each case in the study, we
obtained permission from the judge, jurors, litigants, and
attorneys.  For each case, the entire trial was videotaped from
opening statements to closing arguments and jury instruc-
tions. In the jury rooms two unobtrusive cameras and micro-
phones were mounted at ceiling level. An on-site technician
taped the conversations in the jury room whenever at least two
jurors were present. We drew on the trial videotapes to develop
a detailed “road map” for each trial. Quasi-transcripts were cre-
ated for all juror discussion periods and transcripts were pre-
pared for all deliberation periods.  They allowed detailed
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21. Nicole M. Waters of the National Center for State Courts provided
figures for all completed jury trials in Pima County, Arizona dur-
ing the year 2001: 62% were motor vehicle cases, 8% medical mal-
practice, 23% were other tort cases, and  6% were contract cases.
The plaintiff win rate was 64%. Awards ranged from $2,009 to
$2,472,163 with a median award of $31,165.
22. Wolfson, supra note 13, at 17 (“the great majority of questions
were serious, to the point, and relevant”) (Feb. 1987); Frankel,
supra note 15, at 24 (“the questions asked are thoughtful, perti-
nent, respectful and to the point”). For a researcher’s analysis of
juror questions submitted during trials and deliberations, see
Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or
Not to Ask, That Is the Question,” 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003).
23. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in
Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question
Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV 231, 252 (1988) (83 percent);
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 17, at 141, Table 12 (72 percent in
civil cases, 86 percent in criminal cases); Paula Hannaford & G.
Thomas Munsterman, Final Report for the Massachusetts Project
on Innovative Jury Trial Practices at 4 (2001)(77 percent); Neil P.
Cohen & Daniel R. Cohen, Jury Reform in Tennessee, 34 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1 (2003)(“judges reported that jurors’ questions were ‘gen-
erally appropriate.’. . . [and] propounded them to the witness ‘as
is’ most of the time.”); AOC State of New Jersey Jury
Subcommittee, Report on Pilot Project Allowing Juror Questions
(unpublished AOC Report, 2000) (over three-quarters of the
questions were asked), reported in Mott, supra note 22, at 1104-
1105 (2003); Dodge, supra note 12, at 22 (judges in a pilot study
allowed 76 percent of the questions submitted by jurors).
24. The length of the trial was the sum of the number of hours for
each day of trial from the time the trial began to the time the trial
ended for the day until jurors began their deliberations.
25. (p<.01). This correlation is based on the 47 cases for which we
have both the allowed questions and the disallowed questions.
For three cases, we did not have access to the files of jury ques-
tions and therefore could identify only the juror questions that
the judge allowed a witness to answer.
26. We will focus on the questions that judges allowed witnesses to
answer in another article.
27. The correlation between number of disallowed questions and
length of trial was .34 (p<.05); for allowed questions and length
of trial the correlation was .54 (p<.01). 
28. Jurors instructed that they could discuss the case during trial sub-
mitted an average of 4.11 disallowed questions, and jurors
admonished not to discuss the case submitted an average of 4.5
disallowed questions (t = 0.25, p<.82). 
analyses of the content of juror
discussions and deliberations.
We also obtained copies of all
questions submitted during the
trial or during deliberations,
including those that the judge
did not answer or allow a witness
to answer.
The sample of 50 cases consisted of 26 (52%) motor vehicle
cases, 17 (34%) non-motor vehicle tort cases, 4 (8%) medical
malpractice cases, and 3 (6%) contract cases, a distribution
that is nearly identical to the breakdown for civil jury trials for
the Pima County Superior Court for the 1996-97 fiscal year
and the 2001 calendar year.  The tort cases varied from the
common rear-end collision with a claim of soft-tissue injury to
cases involving severe and permanent injury or death.
Plaintiffs received an award in 65% of the cases.  Awards
ranged from $1,000 to $2.8 million dollars, with a median
award of $25,500.21
The Questions that Jurors Submit 
Judges in other jurisdictions who permit juror questions
report that the questions jurors submit are generally appropri-
ate.22 Nonetheless, the rules of evidence bar a variety of ques-
tions on grounds of relevance and form as well as more tech-
nical bases.  It would be astounding indeed if laypersons lim-
ited their inquiries to legally acceptable grounds and always
expressed their inquiries in legally acceptable terms.   Several
surveys and experiments with juror questions indicate that
judges typically allow witnesses to answer between 72% and
86% of jurors’ questions, leaving 14% to 28% unanswered.23
In the Arizona Filming Project, jurors submitted questions
during 48 of the 50 trials.  In half of the trials, they submitted
10 or fewer questions, with an average of 17.5 per trial.  Across
all cases, jurors submitted an average of less than 1 question
(.76) per hour of trial.24 The number of questions submitted
by the jurors during a trial increased with the length of the trial
(r = .54).25 One jury submitted 110 questions, almost twice
the number submitted in any other trial.  Significantly, the trial
in which this occurred was 77.5 hours in length, amounting to
an average of 1.4 questions per hour.   
Judges allowed answers to 76% of the jurors’ 820 questions.
The questions that the judges allowed were consistent with the
observations from previous reports that jurors generally submit
appropriate and relevant questions.  For example, the jurors
directed nearly half of their questions to expert witnesses, typ-
ically attempting to clarify their testimony or to understand the
bases for their opinions.26 The juror questions that judges
allowed ranged from simple questions about definitions, such
as “What is a tear of the meniscus?” (for a physician) and
“What does the ‘reasonable psychological probability’ mean?”
(for a psychologist who testified using the phrase), to more
complex attempts by jurors to understand the inferences made
by the witness, such as “Is his post-traumatic stress a result of
the confrontation, or a result from his childhood?  Specifically,
could his breakdown be from another accident?” and “Not
knowing how he was sitting, or his weight, how can you be sure
he hit his knee?” (for an engineer testifying about an accident
reconstruction).  But what about the questions that the judge
did not answer or permit the witness to answer?  We turn now
to an analysis of those unanswered questions and to jurors’
reactions when no response was forthcoming. 
Disallowed Juror Questions
In 39 of the 50 trials, judges were presented with at least
one question that they did not allow a witness to answer. In
half the cases, judges rejected 2 or fewer juror questions dur-
ing trial.  Both allowed and disallowed questions occurred
more frequently in longer trials.27 The opportunity to discuss
the evidence during trial did not significantly influence the
rate of submitting either allowed or disallowed questions.28
After examining all of the questions that jurors submitted,





                            
29. Two coders independently categorized the questions, making use
of 15 total categories.  Overall reliability for these categorizations
was modest, weighted kappa = .67 (1.0 indicates perfect reliabil-
ity, zero indicates pure chance agreement).  This value increased
as the two coders gained experience and after they discussed dis-
agreements part-way through coding (weighted kappa on a sub-
set of 56 questions coded post-discussion = .74).  For the cate-
gories listed in Table 1, the coders typically agreed more often
than they disagreed: just two had percent agreement rates below
50% (Definitions/Miscellaneous facts, Parties’ mental state).  
30. Judges allowed witnesses to answer all juror questions in three
categories that are not represented in Table 1.  The questions in
these categories were generally directed toward the experts and
involved 1) extent of injury or damage, 2) basis for diagnosis or
treatment, and 3) credentials or experience of the expert.  
31. See also Mott, supra note 22, at Table 3, 1125 (identifying a simi-
lar set of juror questions, which she labeled “common practices”). 
32. Shari S. Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Juror Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics , 87 VA. L. REV.1857 (2001).
33. Id. at 1909; jurors do not intuitively recognize the collateral
source rule.
we identified 15 types of questions. 29 The breakdown for the
12 categories that produced instances of disallowed questions
appears in Table 1.30
Many of the questions that the judges disallowed reflect
commonsense ways of reasoning based on information that is
excluded under the rules of evidence.  Thus, a number of these
questions centered on a search for a comparison that could
assist the juror in evaluating the plausibility of the plaintiff’s
claims.  The first and most frequent category consisted of what
we termed “Standards”—questions that sought information on
how others might view the present circumstances, essentially
inviting witnesses to give jurors a standard by which to judge
the case (n = 43 questions).31 We subdivided this category into
requests for legal and other standards.  Examples of requests for
legal standards were inquiries such as, “Who was cited in this
accident?” or “Is the defendant required to have his vision and
hearing tested in order to renew his driver’s license, and has he
done so?”  In all such questions, jurors sought to know whether
one of the parties had done something legally improper that
bore a relationship to the conflict being decided.  Examples of
other standards asked witnesses about how the same or similar
circumstances affected people
other than the plaintiff who
were, or could have been,
involved in the incident that
led to trial.  Thus, several juror
questions asked about whether
other passengers in a plaintiff’s
vehicle were also injured (or
whether the defendant was
injured).  Likewise, in a case
involving an alleged infliction
of emotional distress, jurors
asked a non-party witness how
the defendant treated other
people with whom he came in
contact.  These two types of standards questions accounted for
about one-fifth of all disallowed questions. 
A second frequent type of excluded question concerned
jurors’ attempts to obtain information on the character and/or
credibility of the witness.  Although jurors are charged with
evaluating the credibility of witnesses and jurors asked many
questions bearing on credibility that the judge allowed wit-
nesses to answer, the jurors also asked disallowed questions
that could produce potentially prejudicial information, e.g.,
“Has [the plaintiff] been in any other lawsuit considering the
number of accidents he has been involved in?” (directed to the
plaintiff) or called for hearsay, e.g., “Does the [Plaintiff] have
any idea why his employer had an Independent Medical
Examination conducted [on him]?” Some disallowed ques-
tions asked witnesses to offer opinions or to answer questions
when no foundation had been laid that the witness had first-
hand knowledge or asked the witness to draw conclusions that
the jury was charged with making: e.g., “There are differences
between your testimony and that of the plaintiff.  Which one
is telling the truth?”    
Charged with compensating the plaintiff in a civil case,
jurors sometimes interpreted their mandate more broadly than
the law envisions and posed questions that attempted to
explore legally irrelevant financial considerations.  Consistent
with prior analyses of this data set, jurors in civil cases were
interested in the insurance status of both the plaintiff and the
defendant.32 For example, jurors may express concern about
overcompensating plaintiffs who have already received pay-
ments from insurance companies33 or they may wonder
whether the defendant will be paying any award out of pocket.
Insurance questions alone constituted 12% of all disallowed
questions, with jurors posing 23 questions in 12 trials; in 4 of














Character or credibility 
of witness
24 12









Litigation management 13 7
Definitions and miscellaneous facts 27 14
Cause of the injury 24 12
Parties’ mental state 18 9
Predictions about future injury 6 3
Other topics or unclear 17 9
TABLE 1: TYPES OF QUESTIONS JUDGES DISALLOWED








under the rules of
evidence.
             
34. We did not have access to the sidebar conversations in which the
attorneys had the opportunity to voice objections, and we have
not attempted to identify the rationale for excluding each of the
disallowed questions.  We note, however, that the judges were
typically generous in permitting witnesses to answer juror ques-
tions even when the wording of the question was somewhat awk-
ward or unartful.  We suspect that such instances occurred when
the question did not draw an objection from either attorney.
these trials, jurors submitted
multiple inquiries (2 questions
in two cases, 4 in one case, 7 in
another), sometimes asking
essentially the same question
in different guises (e.g., “Does
the plaintiff have insurance
coverage?” and “Who paid the
chiropractor bill?”).  Jurors
also occasionally asked about
attorneys’ fees, generally recog-
nizing that the plaintiff would
not receive the full amount of
any compensatory award they
made. 
A fourth source of disallowed questions consisted of
inquiries about how the lawsuit itself had been or was being
managed (n = 13 questions, 7% of all disallowed)—for exam-
ple, “When did you initiate this lawsuit?” and “How did you
come up with your damage figure?” (directed at plaintiffs in
different cases).  
We also identified instances of questions close to the central
controversies in the cases (i.e., establishing what happened,
negligence, liability, damages, etc.), but which, for a variety of
possible reasons, the judge did not allow.  Fourteen percent of
questions asked a witness for definitions or to explain some
fact about what happened (e.g., “Was the impact in a forward
or rearward direction?”; “How many people were in each
car?”), but were not allowed, presumably because no founda-
tion had been laid that the witness had firsthand knowledge
and, thus, was competent to answer the question.  In 24 cases
(12%), jurors asked for information that might illuminate the
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (e.g., “Can we see a picture of
what the plaintiff looked like before the accident?” or “What
percent of your current problems are a result of this acci-
dent?”); and in 18 cases, their questions touched on the men-
tal state of the parties, including questions about potential neg-
ligence, recklessness, or intent (e.g., “How long did the plain-
tiff wait at the intersection before entering?” or whether a
defendant had posted a sign warning of a potentially danger-
ous condition).  In 6 cases, the jurors asked witnesses to fore-
cast what the plaintiff’s injuries would be like in the future
(e.g., how long it might take a psychotherapist to relieve an
anxiety disorder).
A variety of reasons in addition to those we noted above
may explain why some questions were not posed to wit-
nesses.34 In some instances, the question was asked too late or
too early so that it was offered at the end of testimony by the
wrong witness.  When a later witness testified who could
address the issue, one of the attorneys generally followed up.
Other disallowed questions called for speculation; were
expressed in a form that made them objectionable, e.g., “Are
you being paid to testify here today?” (asked of an expert); or
were simply unclear about what the juror was asking, e.g., a
juror wanted to know “What does ‘bodiar’ the witness entitle
the lawyer to do?” (The juror probably meant “voir dire” but
was unable to accurately repeat the phrase he had just heard
and wanted to understand.)  In other instances, the question
would have been appropriate for one witness, but not for
another, and it was not clear when the question was submitted
and which witness was the target of the question.  Finally, on
a few occasions, the question was directed to an appropriate
witness and submitted at the appropriate time and the ques-
tion appeared to be admissible, but the witness was not
allowed to answer it.  For example, in one case a juror wanted
to ask the plaintiff how long he was stopped at the stop sign
before the collision occurred.  The plaintiff had already testi-
fied that he had come to a stop and an issue in the case was
how fast he had been going when the collision took place.
When No Immediate Answer Was Given
We turn now to the aftermath of these questions: how the
judge and the jury responded to the questions that the judge
did not allow the witness to answer.
Judicial Responses: The judge formally acknowledged less
than a third (32%) of the 197 juror questions that were disal-
lowed (see Figure 1).  The tendency to acknowledge or not
acknowledge questions was typically, but not always, consis-
tent within the same trial.  In 14 trials, the judge acknowl-
edged no juror question (range: 1 to 16 questions); in 11 cases,
the judged acknowledged all of the questions in some way
(range: 1 to 6 questions); and in 14 trials the judge acknowl-
edged some but not others (e.g., in one case, the judge
explained that insurance was not relevant to the jurors’ deci-
sion but said nothing when jurors wanted to know if anyone
else in the plaintiff’s vehicle had been injured).  
Acknowledgment of the jurors’ questions took many forms.
Judges sometimes said only, “Some questions were objected to
for one reason or another,” or “Some questions cannot be
answered.”  In several instances, the judge informed the jury
that one of the submitted questions would be more appropri-
ate for a later witness or would be addressed in later testimony.
In another instance when jurors asked a witness to solve a con-
flict between his testimony and that of another witness, the
judge explained that it was the jury’s job to make decisions
about such conflicts.  Finally, judges also explicitly cited the
law in explaining why a question would not be permitted, say-
ing, for instance, that a given issue was not “relevant” or, in
one case, that the “Federal Rules of Evidence” did not allow
the question.  Explanations about legal constraints on ques-
tions could be short (e.g., “The jury cannot consider insurance
in its decision”), but occasionally involved lengthy recaps
about the specific issues the jury was to solve (e.g., who was
“legally obligated to make payment for [the plaintiff’s] medical
bills and . . . repair of the vehicle”), including reminders that
who paid the bills was “outside your relevant area of inquiry as










question . . . .
        
35. We coded as follows: 1 = no discussion; 2 =  explicit acknowl-
edgment that the information is unnecessary or irrelevant; 3 =
wistful or begrudging acceptance of the lack of information (e.g.,
acknowledging they were unlikely to get an answer but still want-
ing to know—we combined this category with no. 2 to describe
the jurors as accepting the non-answer); 4 = explicitly negative
reactions (e.g., explicit annoyance, complaint, or statements
insisting the information is relevant); 5 = attempts to give or sug-
gest an answer to the question (including by not countering an
answer developed during a previous discussion period—to count,
the answer or its relevance to the case had to be undisputed by
other jurors).  Two coders demonstrated high reliability in assign-
ing text to these categories, weighted kappa = .79.
36. F (1, 157) = 2.77, p<.10.  This test statistic reflects controls for the
fact that cases differed in the extent to which judges acknowl-
edged juror questions (“non-independence of observations” in
statistical parlance).
37. The case is discussed in more detail in the text at note 39.
far as the decision that you have to make in this case.”
The judicial tendency not to acknowledge disallowed juror
questions explicitly or to explain why they were not being
posed to the witness may be attributable to two factors.  First,
the judges in all of these cases gave the jurors a pre-instruction
on juror questions, warning them that not all of their questions
could be addressed:   
If I decide the question is proper, an answer will be
provided at the earliest logical opportunity.  Keep in
mind, however, that the rules of evidence or other rules
of law may prevent some questions from being asked.
I will apply the same legal standards to your questions
as I do to the questions asked by the lawyers.
Jurors were thus on notice that some of their questions
would not be answered.  In addition, an explicit response to an
irrelevant question might unnecessarily require the judge to
expose the rest of the jury to that question.  As we shall see,
there may be some value in providing at least a perfunctory
acknowledgment of each unanswered question when the occa-
sion arises.
Jurors’ Reactions When Questions Were Disallowed: After an
issue is raised by a juror and the juror’s question is not
answered, the issue may simply be dropped and not discussed
among the jurors at all, or it may receive further attention from
the jurors. That further attention can take one of three forms.
First, a juror may mention having posed a question, note that
there was no answer, and accept the lack of an answer without
complaint or even with understanding (e.g., by asserting that
the issue must, in fact, be irrelevant).  Second, consistent with
the worries of those apprehensive about juror questions, the
jury may chafe at the non-response, casting the judge’s decision
in a negative light.  Finally, jurors not given an answer to their
question may consider what the answer actually is.  We coded
all responses into categories to reflect these responses.35 Figure
1 describes the frequency of these responses.
The most common reaction from jurors was no reaction at
all, either during the trial itself or during deliberations.  Jurors
referred, in one way or another, to only 38% of their disallowed
questions.  Jurors were somewhat more likely to discuss a ques-
tion that the judge acknowledged than to discuss a question
when the judge had said nothing:  45% of acknowledged ques-
tions received some mention, whereas only 34% of unacknowl-
edged questions did so.36 In most instances, however, whether
or not the juror’s question was acknowledged, any discussion
that followed was limited.  Typically, conversations lasted no
more than 10 “turns” (a turn ends when another juror speaks).
The exceptions arose when the topic was insurance or attor-
neys fees, when conversation continued for up to 80 turns. One
additional case that drew an extended discussion occurred
when the jurors submitted several questions on the same topic
without receiving an answer.37
When jurors did mention an unanswered question, almost
half (49%) of the time the jury either explicitly accepted the
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FIGURE 1: JUROR REACTIONS WHEN A QUESTION IS DISALLOWED
       
38. Twenty-five (25) of these occasions occurred during discussion
periods and 11 during deliberations.
39. The legal issue was not dealt with in the jury instructions at the
end of the trial, and the jurors discussed it during deliberations as
well as during the trial.
40. Jurors were able to answer three additional unanswered insurance
questions by examining bills that were included among the case
exhibits.
lack of response or expressed
no complaint and swiftly
turned to other topics for dis-
cussion.38 In some of these
reactions, jurors reminded
others that the judge said the
information was not relevant
or pointed out, as one juror
did, that “it doesn’t do any
good to guess.”  In others,
they explained to their fellow
jurors why they had submit-
ted a question but then
expressed neither satisfaction
nor dissatisfaction or com-
mented in some other neutral
way.  In short, all such jurors appeared to “move on,” irrespec-
tive of whether they might have preferred to have an answer.  
Overt annoyance or displeasure with the judge’s failure to
pose the question was exceedingly rare (see Figure 1):  we
identified just seven responses (4%) from three cases as explic-
itly negative; four of these seven complaints came from a sin-
gle jury and involved a single issue; two others came from a
different jury; and the remaining one from a third jury.  The
jury expressing four complaints was deciding a case involving
the potential negligence of a business. The jurors wanted to
know if the law required the business to post a sign in the
establishment and whether a sign had been posted, believing
that the answers might signal negligent behavior.  The judge
did not acknowledge the jurors’ two related questions, either
the first time or the second time they were submitted.
Although persistent, the “complaints” were phrased in mild
terms (e.g., one juror said that she was “shocked” that the
judge would not answer the questions).39 In both of the other
cases involving juror complaints, a single juror simply
expressed the belief that the information that had been
requested was relevant, even if the judge had ruled otherwise.
For example, a juror asked if either of the two motorists
involved in a collision had received citations, and the judge
said that the question was not relevant.  A juror expressed the
opinion that it would be pertinent to find who’s at fault.  The
disagreement here may be with the terminology.  Arguably, a
citation in the accident is relevant, but is excluded because it
is both hearsay and potentially prejudicial.   
Finally, we identified a number of instances in which jurors
attempted to answer a question the judge had not allowed.  We
found 31 such occurrences (involving 16% of all disallowed
questions).   In 12 instances, jurors suggested answers by
drawing reasonable inferences directly from the evidence.  For
example, one case involved someone seated in the rear of a
vehicle who claimed he was injured in an accident after hitting
the car’s front seat.  A juror submitted a question about
whether it was likely that the other passenger riding in the
back would also have hit the front seat.  When this juror men-
tioned the unanswered inquiry to her fellow jurors during dis-
cussion, another juror informed her that the laws of physics
(to which experts had testified) applied equally to all passen-
gers.  Jurors drew on their own experience or beliefs to address
10 additional unanswered questions about insurance or attor-
ney’s fees. 40 For example, a juror who submitted an unan-
swered question about insurance speculated that the plaintiff
probably did not pay much for the accident because he proba-
bly had disability insurance.  
The remaining answers to inquiries came from jurors’ per-
sonal experiences or expertise or from a combination of per-
sonal expertise and reasoning based on what they had heard in
court.  For example, the judge in one case did not allow a wit-
ness to answer a question about the muscular side effects of a
steroidal medication a plaintiff had been taking.  Later in delib-
erations, when the juror who submitted the question reintro-
duced it, mentioning that it had been left unanswered, another
juror explained that the steroid in question was an anti-inflam-
matory, not an agent that affected muscle tone.  In a few
instances, jurors’ guesses about answers reflected conclusions
one of the parties likely wished to avoid.  For example, a juror
in one case asked why a plaintiff was no longer working in the
area in which she had been trained; the juror later wondered if
the reason was because the plaintiff had done “something bad”
in her prior job. Nearly all (30 of 31) of the unanswered ques-
tions that jurors discussed involved the kinds of issues and
responses that naturally occur during deliberations even if a
juror has not submitted a question on the topic.  In only one
instance did a juror draw a conclusion from the fact that the
judge did not answer the juror’s question.  In an automobile
accident involving claims for both personal and property dam-
age, a juror asked whether the plaintiff’s vehicle had a particu-
lar design feature and the judge did not acknowledge the ques-
tion.  The juror said, “I got no answer, so evidently it’s not [part
of the design].” No acknowledged juror question, whether the
acknowledgment was perfunctory or more complete, produced
this kind of inference.
Juror attempts to address the unanswered questions varied
substantially across the types of questions posed.  When jurors
discussed unanswered questions they had submitted about
standards, jurors attempted to answer only 15% of them.  In
contrast, when they discussed unanswered insurance ques-
tions, jurors attempted to answer 79% of them (11 of the 14
they discussed at all).  Jurors also suggested answers to both of
the inquiries about attorney fees (concluding in one case that
attorneys “usually” got half the award, and in the other that it
could be anywhere between 25% and 45%).  These responses
to questions on legally irrelevant financial topics account for
almost half of the answers (42%) that jurors offered one
another when a question was disallowed.  As we have previ-
ously observed, talk and speculation in the jury room about
the insurance of the parties are common even when jurors do












    
41. See Diamond & Vidmar, supra at note 32.
42. Id. at 1910 for a description of potential jury instructions on the
topic of insurance.
43. Jurors are told: “If a particular question is not asked, do not guess
why or what the answer might have been.”  
44. Again, it is significant that almost half of the answers jurors
offered concerned the topic of insurance or attorneys’ fees. See
generally Diamond & Vidmar, supra at note 32.  
45. Civil Trial Practice Standard Part One: The Jury, Standard 4
(1998).
46. Id. at 4b. (i), (ii), and (iii).
47. Id. at 4b x.
not submit questions about insurance,41 reinforcing the notion
that jurors should be specifically instructed on the irrelevance
of insurance in tort cases.42
Summary of Findings
As our survey of juror questions during trial indicates, more
than three-quarters (76%) of the questions that the jurors sub-
mit are legally appropriate. Jurors not only appreciate the
opportunity to submit questions, but also formulate relevant
questions to assist them in evaluating the evidence.  Our analy-
sis of the questions jurors submit that judges do not allow
under current evidentiary rules reveals that those questions are
likely to concern topics like legal standards and insurance, top-
ics that reflect commonsense ways of reasoning and common
knowledge but that evidentiary rules preclude jurors from
obtaining information about in reaching their verdicts.
Although jurors appreciate the opportunity to submit ques-
tions, they rarely express disappointment or even surprise
when the judge does not supply them with an answer.  The
preliminary instruction that judges in Arizona use informs
jurors that they will not always be able to receive answers to
the questions they submit, and popular lay understanding of
how trials work probably prepared the jurors to accept that
outcome for most of their unanswered questions.  Thus, the
concern with juror reactions to unanswered questions did not
materialize.  We did observe a few occasions when jurors
expressed annoyance with the failure to respond to a juror
question.  Significantly, only one instance of expressed annoy-
ance occurred when the judge gave even a perfunctory non-
specific acknowledgment that the question could not be
allowed.  Although jurors were somewhat more likely to dis-
cuss an unanswered question when the judge acknowledged it,
that discussion was generally brief, except when the topic was
insurance or attorneys’ fees.
Finally, when the judge did not allow the jurors to obtain an
answer directly, a minority of the juries did attempt to answer
their own questions.  In doing this, the jurors technically vio-
lated the pre-instruction admonition not to attempt to answer
questions that the judge declined to allow.43 Importantly,
many of the same questions and answers that jurors supplied
may have emerged even in the absence of a juror question for-
mally submitted by a juror during the trial (i.e., during the
normal course of deliberations in which jurors regularly use
one another to resolve sources of ambiguity).44
Implications for Procedures Used When Juror Questions Are
Permitted
The procedures used when jurors are permitted to submit
questions generally give counsel the opportunity to object to a
juror question outside the hearing of the jury and permit attor-
neys to ask appropriate follow-up questions when a juror ques-
tion is answered. There is also
agreement that the jurors
should be told in advance that
it will not be possible to allow
some of their questions to be
asked. As the results here
show, jurors generally under-
stand and accept the legiti-
macy of these procedures.  
Cautionary Instructions:
Less agreement exists on the
standards for the instructions
that jurors should receive
about how and when they
should submit their questions,
other than the question should be submitted in writing.  A cur-
rent Standard of the American Bar Association45 supports juror
questions for witnesses, but suggests that a series of cautionary
instructions be given, including a warning that “Questions
should be reserved for important points only”; that “The sole
purpose of juror questions is to clarify the testimony, not to
comment on it or express any opinion about it”; and that
“Jurors are not to argue with the witness.”46 The instructions
received by the jurors we studied did not include any of these
warnings.  The 820 questions we reviewed in these 50 cases,
including the 197 that the judge did not allow, provided no
instances of jurors submitting frivolous questions and only a
few that could be characterized as argumentative.  (E.g., a juror
submitted a question for the plaintiff asking how he would
work full-time after the trial.  The plaintiff was claiming that
the accident had temporarily impaired his ability to work and
the jurors were skeptical about that claim.) Indeed, almost all
of the questions appeared to reflect serious attempts to under-
stand the evidence and to help the jurors assess how it could
assist them to evaluate the competing claims of the parties.
Even without such cautionary admonitions, jurors censored
their own potential questions.  On average, the jurors dis-
cussed almost 2 potential questions per case (1.7) that they
then decided not to submit.  Their restrained behavior suggests
that jurors need not be cautioned that they should limit their
instructions to important ones.  The danger of including such
cautionary instructions is that they will have a chilling effect
on jurors’ questions, discouraging jurors from attempting to
resolve the areas of confusion that the opportunity to submit
questions was designed to help them deal with. A similar issue
also arises with the recommendation from the Civil Trial
Practice Standards that juror questions be signed.47 In
Arizona, jurors are instructed not to sign their name when they
submit a question on the assumption that jurors should not
have to worry about appearing ignorant when they are experi-
encing some confusion.   
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and only a few
that could be 
characterized as
argumentative.
                         
48. Judicial silence led to an unwarranted inference in one case
described supra at p. 26.
49. Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 32, at 1884.
50. Id. at Section V for a full description of collaborative jury instruc-
tions.
Acknowledging Juror Questions: One decision that judges
who permit juror questions must make is what if anything to
say to a jury in response to a question that cannot be answered.
As we have seen, judges often rely primarily on their pretrial
instruction informing jurors that “the rules of evidence or
other rules of law may prevent some questions from being
asked” and say nothing further to the jurors.  That approach
avoids exposing the other members of the jury to a question
that is irrelevant or otherwise improper.  Although jurors gen-
erally do not complain about this implicit rejection of a ques-
tion, jurors do seem to appreciate it when judges offer even a
perfunctory acknowledgment that a submitted question can-
not be addressed without describing the question itself.
Moreover, that response prevents a juror from drawing an
inference about the answer to the question from the judge’s
silence.48 In a few other instances, a series of questions sub-
mitted on the same topic stimulated the judge to be more
direct and specific.  For example, jurors in one case submitted
several questions asking who owned the property where the
injury occurred.  After the third question was submitted, the
judge told the jurors, “A couple of you, Ladies and Gentlemen,
asked questions concerning [the location].  Although these are
things you may wonder about, for the purpose of what you
have to decide today, it doesn’t make any difference.” The
jurors never referred to these questions in their discussions
during trial or during their deliberations.  The approach that
this judge adopted recognizes that the jurors can be given
assistance in identifying relevant information.  In other situa-
tions, jurors may need further assistance in understanding why
a question cannot be addressed.  
An Ancillary Value
Are unanswered jury questions merely an incidental cost of
permitting jurors to submit questions?  Some additional obser-
vations suggest that even the disallowed questions have some
ancillary value.  In one case, the jurors’ early questions sug-
gested that they were trying to assess the negligence of the
defendant when the defendant had already conceded negli-
gence.  The jurors’ questions provided an occasion for the
judge to correct that misimpression in the course of denying
the jurors’ request for the irrelevant information.  Thus, even
the unanswered questions, which the judge shares with the
attorneys in deciding whether the question will be allowed,
can signal potential sources of juror confusion that the judge
or the attorneys may be able to address.
Similarly, the natural interest of jurors in insurance arises
whether or not jurors pose a question about it.49 A juror ques-
tion about insurance, however, provides a natural occasion for a
collaborative instruction from the judge that recognizes the rea-
sonableness of the jurors’ interest and helps jurors understand
why they should not be focusing on insurance.50 A full collab-
orative instruction would accurately explain why insurance is
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Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Instructions in the
New Millenium, Summer 1999 COURT
REVIEW at 28.
Linguist and law professor Peter
Tiersma provides practical guidance
on making jury instructions under-
standable.  The article includes a
helpful list of legal words often used
and words that could be more appro-
priately used with a jury.
Robert G. Boatright & Beth Murphy, How
Judges Can Help Deliberating Juries: Using
the Guide for Jury Deliberations, Summer
1999 COURT REVIEW at 38.
Boatright and Murphy explain, based
on research in 12 jury trials, how
jurors can benefit from additional
background information about how
to go about the work they are to
expected to do.
A FEW, FINAL ARTICLES
Symposium Issue:  The Jury at a
Crossroad: The American Experience,




This symposium issue contains 10
articles discussing the role of the
jury—past, present, and future.
Topics covered include social science
research on race and juries, ways to
improve the voir dire process, and the
jury’s historic and present role in
statutory interpretation.  
Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar,
Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis & Beth Murphy,
Jury Discussions During Civil Trials:
Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 U.
ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003).
http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/vidmar/
AzLR.pdf 
This article provides an in-depth eval-
uation of the Arizona innovation per-
mitting juries to discuss the evidence
during the trial.  The evaluation was
based on an experiment that involved
the videotaping of actual jury discus-
sions and deliberations. 
irrelevant (e.g., it tells nothing about negligence or how much
damage was caused) and would let jurors know that any specu-
lation about how much insurance the parties have, or even
whether or not they have any insurance, would be inaccurate.51
CONCLUSION
Most of the recent innovations in jury trials recognize that
jurors are active decision makers and adjust trial procedures to
reflect that reality.  Whether or not jurors are permitted to sub-
mit questions during trial, we know that questions are occur-
ring to them as they try to understand the evidence in antici-
pation of being charged with reaching a verdict.  Permitting
jurors to submit their questions during trial provides the
opportunity to learn what those juror questions are and to
address them when possible.  As this research indicates, even
when judges tell the jury that they cannot allow a witness to
answer a juror’s questions, the jurors generally accept the deci-
sion easily and move on.  The need to leave some juror ques-
tions unanswered offers no justification for missing the oppor-
tunity to assist jurors in reaching well-grounded decisions.
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